

கழுக்கம்



நீதியரசர் திருமதி அருணா ஜெகதீசன் விசாரணை ஆணையம்

22.05.2018ஆம் நாள் தூத்துக்குடியில் நடந்த துப்பாக்கி சூட்டின் விளைவாக இறப்பு, காயங்கள் ஏற்பட்டதற்கான காரணங்கள், சூழ்நிலைகள் குறித்தும் சட்டம் மற்றும் ஒழுங்கு சீர்குலைவுகள் காரணமாக பொது சொத்துக்கள், தனியார் சொத்துக்கள் ஆகியவற்றிற்கு ஏற்படுத்தப்பட்ட சேதம் உள்ளிட்ட பிந்தைய நிகழ்வுகள் குறித்து விசாரிப்பதற்கு அமைக்கப்பட்டது.

இறுதி அறிக்கை
பகுதி - IV

நீதியரசர் திருமதி அருணா ஜெகதீசன்



நீதியரசர் திருமதி. அருணா ஜெகதீசன்
விசாரணை ஆணையம்

இறுதி அறிக்கை

பகுதி - IV

Reference IV:**To recommend suitable measures to prevent therecurrence of such incidents in future.**

1. This Commission having answered points 1 to 3 of the terms of reference as above, it is time now to consider suitable measures to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in future. There is already a jungle of laws, rules, regulations, Police Standing Orders, Riot Control scheme and so on to deal effectively with the riot situations so that jungle law (might is right) does not prevail. This Commission would consider it appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions of law, PSOs, Riot control scheme etc. and underscore the need for scrupulous adherence to those provisions.

2. It is obvious from the study of the activities of the Executive Magistrates in Thoothukudi on the 22nd of May, 2018, that they were insufficiently prepared and untrained for their roles as Executive Magistrates. Having been posted to their duty one day prior to the day of the protest, they were unable to carry out any of the required duties of

Magistrates, more particularly, as provided in the curricula for training of Magistrates:

3. A cursory glance at the curricula prescribed for training the Special Executive Magistrate would enable the Commission to appreciate the responsibilities to be discharged by them. They are

1. Rounding up of anti-social elements
2. Combating rumours and panic
3. Combing operations for unearthing arms and ammunition
4. Setting up of a control room
5. Up-dating internal security scheme
6. Cultivating favourable public opinion
7. Thorough knowledge of localities and lanes likely to beaffected
8. Proper briefing and training of force
9. Discreet contact of responsible officers with leaders of agitation

4. The Executive instructions to be issued by the special Executive Magistrates inter alia include:

1. Declaring the assembly unlawful
2. Warning and exhortations before order of dispersal
3. Force to be used only if order is defied
4. Assessment to be made whether order is defied
5. Tear -gas
6. Lathi charge
7. Responsibility for use of force will rest with Magistrates
8. Stop fire by Magistrate in consultation with police officer
9. Stop use of force as soon as objectives attained. Magistrates to decide when sufficient force used
10. Assessment whether objectives are attained
11. Firing in volleys, aim low, directed at most threatening part of the crowd. No blanks. No firing in the air.

5. The Special Executive Magistrates is required to perform the following duties post firing. They are

1. Posting pickets for maintenance of order
2. Remove dead for post-mortem and injured for treatment

3. Immediate information of facts to superior officer/Government

6. The Magistrates failed to observe, monitor, record and restrain unlawful activities on the part of the police in following the protocols with respect to use of force. They failed to undertake responsible post-firing activities including removing the dead for the post – mortem and treatment of injured. The Special Executive Magistrates posted at different localities and those who appointed untrained revenue officers to the crucial role are liable for action on account of non-compliance with requirement of Cr.P.C. and PSOs.

7. The requirements of the PSO are to be scrupulously adhered to by the police. They are as follows

Violation of PSO

As per PSO 698, police officers are required to monitor the different developments in their jurisdiction from an early stage and to intervene in the early stages.

Chapter xxxix. Preservation of peace –

PSO 698. Watching for developments – (1)..it is very essential for the local officers to keep continuous watch over developments from the very early stages, even though the circumstances may be such as to render it unnecessary or even undesirable for them to intervene in the early stage. The District Collector must make effective arrangements to see that he is fully and continuously kept abreast of the situation as it develops. The responsibility for such liaison rests entirely on the Collector.

(2) One of the most important duties of the police is the collection of information about every movement, state of feeling, dispute or incident, which may lead to a breach of the peace and the communication of such information to the District Collector. Failure in the performance of this duty will be severely noticed.

8. It stands to reason that the District Collector must also be open to receive such information and take note of its significance. Other precautionary measures to be taken under the PSOs include taking of excessive rather than inadequate precautions, during times of acute tension since these tend to inspire confidence in the weaker party and caution in

the stronger one. They also tend to check the inflammatory elements on both sides. The PSOs state that precautions in towns must be taken with specific reference to the town's specific needs and threats, specifying

(6) in the case of towns, the following precautions have proved of value during periods of sustained tension. Some of them with suitable modifications may usefully be followed in any large-scale dispute outside towns also.

9. Intelligence is considered to be of paramount importance. The PSOs require the police in charge of low level of the end of intelligence to set up independent sources and get information of any portents of communal trouble or other disturbances and effective measures should be taken to nip in the bud any trouble that is likely to develop. Measures include, increasing the number of the police pickets, strengthening of local police, stationing of units of armed reserve at strategic and vital places. The institution of Armed Police Patrols in vehicles fitted

with wireless sets and the establishment of a Police Control Room with necessary striking force, ambulance and fire brigade. If vital places are not connected by telephone, a wireless station should be established and few dispatch riders on motor cycles may be kept ready for communicating orders promptly.

10. The PSOs require that known bad characters likely to take an active part in the disorder if it occurs and unruly elements as are suspected to be responsible for the tension, hooligans and urchins likely to cause breach of peace should be rounded up under Section 151 Cr.P.C. Further, prosecution must be initiated under Section 153 – A, IPC or action under Section 108 Cr.P.C., against those who promote enmity or ill- feeling. Section 144 is to be applied only after these precautionary and preventive measures are taken.

PSO 699, Preventive action – (1) when a breach of peace is anticipated, the police should take timely

action under the preventive sections of chapter xi and xii of the Cr.P.C and under sections 30 and 30a of the Police Act, 1861. First report made to magistrate with a view to action being taken under sections 144 and 145 of the Cr.P.C should be made on the first information report form and subsequent reports on the case diary forms, as in ordinary cases under the IPC and copies sent to the superior police officers concerned.

(2) in a serious emergency relating to the disturbance of the peace recourse should be had to the appointment of special police officers under section 16 of the madras district police act, 1859. Instructions to regulate enrolment and employment of special police officers are contained in PSO volume II.

It may be noted that if the police were of the opinion that more number of police officers are required, steps should have been taken to appoint special police officers.

(3) all public officers shall consider it their duty to do everything that is possible for the removal of causes of friction.. to foster good relations and friendly feelings between different sections of the public, to take all possible precautions to prevent disorders and to spare no efforts in bringing

disorders under control with the least possible delay. There should be no hesitation in taking disciplinary action against any Government servant who is guilty of any willful neglect of duty or who contributed openly or covertly to the origin or the continuance of the tension.

(b) police officers, should, whenever a suitable the opportunity presents itself, impress on the people that it is the primary duty of the citizen to keep the peace and to do everything in their power for the removal of communal and other ill feelings that disturb the public peace.

11. Precautions also require actions to be taken under the Police Act or other provisions of the law to control or prohibit processions, etc. These include watching for strangers, and making use of Sections 41, 42, 107, 109 and 151, Cr.P.C where required. Further, it is the duty of the police to monitor the state of feelings in the community and respond appropriately under

PSO 700 (1). It is the duty of the Police to watch the state of feelings, disputes or incidents among the communities and to take adequate measures to

prevent breaches of peace which if they occur, must be handled immediately and effectively. Precautionary measures for preventing such disorders should include beside the several measures mentioned in Order No. 698, action under section 151 of the Cr.P.C against rowdies or persons likely by their actions to create trouble. In proper cases those who incite class hatred should be proceeded against under Section 153 - A of the IPC.

(c) police officers should keep the concerned executive magistrates informed of the course of any agitation or dispute that is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The following items should be emphasized in their reports, (i) area affected, (ii) cause of dispute, (iii) number of persons involved in the dispute, (iv) leaders of the dispute and the action, if any, suggested against them and (v) precautionary arrangements, if any, necessary.

(d) the Superintendent of Police will be held responsible for promptly communicating such information to the Collector all his district, the range Deputy Inspector General of Police, the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Intelligence), C.I.D. and the Director - General of Police, Chennai.

12. It is the duty of the police, in cooperation with the local government and administration to

prepare Riot Schemes and to ensure that the authorities responsible are in full preparedness and are have practiced the protocols in the scheme well.

PSO 703

Any Executive Magistrate or officer in charge of a police station or, in the absence of such officer in charge, any police officer, not below the rank of a Sub - Inspector, may command any unlawful assembly, or any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace, to disperse; and it shall thereupon be the duty of the members of such assembly to disperse accordingly.

If, upon being so commanded, any such assembly does not disperse, or if, without being so commanded, it conducts itself in such a manner as to show a determination not to disperse, any Executive Magistrate or police officer referred to in sub-section (1), may proceed to disperse such assembly by force, and may require the assistance of any male person, not being an officer or member of the armed forces and acting as such, for the purpose of dispersing such assembly, and if, necessary, arresting and confining the persons who form part of it, in order to disperse such assembly or that they may be punished according to law.

Police Officers who are below the rank of Sub-Inspector are not empowered to declare a mob unlawful. But they can exercise the right of private defence which is available to every other person as per Section 97 of the IPC.

13. Three Tahsildars have filed FIRs admitting that they ordered the police to fire. This is violative of PSO 703; Tahsildars may command an unlawful assembly to disperse and may only direct the police to disperse the unlawful assembly using minimum necessary force.

2(d) All commands to the police are to be given by Officer – in - Command of the party.

2(f) The main principle to be observed is that the minimum necessary force to achieve the desired object should be used regulating it according to the circumstances of each case. The object of the use of force is to prevent disturbance of the peace or to disperse an assembly which threatens such disturbances and has either refused to disperse or shows a determination not to disperse; no punitive or repressive considerations being permitted to become operative while this is being done.

PSO 703 (2) (f) was repeatedly violated by the police engaging in punitive beating with lathis on persons dispersing, minors who were perceived as being 'defiant', and retreating women and minors.

The officer in-charge of the police is directly responsible for the amount of force used and the manner in which it was used as per PSO 703 (2) (g) and (h). and therefore liable for any excessive or punitive use of force.

As per PSO 703, mob control protocol is a long and patient series of magisterial decisions and directions, supported by operational competency of the Police Officer in-charge.

PSO 703(2) (i) If the crowd refuses to follow the lawful instructions to disperse, the riot flag should be raised, the attention of the mob drawn through a bugle call with long blast and a clear warning that force would be used to disperse them will be given through megaphone. The operation will commence if the mob refuses to heed the warning.

(g) Officers commanding police parties will on every occasion when employed in the suppression of a riot or enforcement of law, ensure that the fullest warning is given to the mob in a clear and distinct manner before any order is given to use teargas or lathi or firearms and to use the most effective means

to explain beforehand to the people opposed to them, in the event of the police party ordered to fire that the fire will be effective.

(h) If any or all these methods fail to disperse the mob and if in his opinion nothing short of firing can disperse the mob, the Executive Magistrate will order fire to be opened. Again the manner in which firing is to be directed against the mob, type of ammunition to be used and the method of firing are the individual responsibilities of the senior most police officer.

PSO 703 (3) If the crowd becomes defiant teargas should be used effectively. If this becomes infructuous then lathi cane charge can be made. If the crowd is still defiant resort may be had to the use of firearms.

4(a) it is not necessary that on every occasion teargas should be used. Use of teargas will depend on the availability of a sufficient stock of gas ammunition, wind direction, nature of the neighborhood and availability of escape routes for the mob.

(b) Use of fire engines to spray water-jets at the mob also depends on the existing circumstances. This method of dispersal is possible when the mob is not armed and is not very violent. It can be tried either before or after the use of teargas. Fast

colours added to the water will enable the identification of the members of the unlawful assembly for the purpose of subsequent arrest and prosecution.

14. This means that all responsibility for the wrongful firing and unintended or intended wrongful consequences of the firing are to be the responsibilities of the senior most officers present. The mere presence or admission of the Magistrate that he ordered the firing is not sufficient excuse for the liability cast on the senior most officer.

15. The protocol states that lathi charge should follow teargas usage. However, police repeatedly resorted to lathi charge without following protocol, while the ineffective and intermittent use of teargas was followed at the whim of those in possession of teargas guns. The teargas guns were held by individuals not in section formation. The PSO states that it is not necessary to use teargas, and that the use of teargas must depend on various factors.

However, in Thoothukudi teargas was used without consideration of the factors. Ineffective use of teargas is not to be considered proper following of the protocol.

16. The police party used for dispersing mobs should wear uniform including boots, puttees and steel fibre glass helmets. The police party should be provided with riot shields. The teargas sections and the armed body protecting the teargas section should wear anti-gas respirators.

17. If the police had followed water jet protocol, they would have been able to arrest the persons responsible for any unlawful activity.

PSO 703 (4) (e) if water jets or teargas fail to disperse the mob, lathi charge should be ordered. Lathi charge should not be attempted if the strength of the police force is not adequate to create an effect on the crowd, and the crowd is likely to overwhelm the police party easily. The personnel engaged in the lathi charge should be under the proper control and the charging should cease as soon as the desired objective is achieved. The procedure laid down in the

Drill and Training Manual will be followed. Care should be taken to prevent the lathi sections getting separated from the main party and the commander.

18. It may be noted that, on several occasions and several different areas of Thoothukudi city, roving parties of policemen separated from the main party and without their commander undertook lathi charge and punitive lathi beating without proper protocol.

PSO 703 5(a) If lathi charge also fails and when it is certain that nothing short of firing can disperse the mob a distinct and clear warning that firing would be resorted to resulting in the loss of life should be given. Bugles will be used to draw the attention of the crowd. Riot flag will be raised and the warning administered through megaphones.

19. It may be seen that no Riot flags were raised, no megaphone warnings were given, and no bangles were sounded.

PSO 703 5(b) the cardinal principles in mob firing are:

I. Firing should be resorted to only when all other means of mob dispersal fails.

II. Firing should be selective and controlled. The senior-most officer will watch the reaction of the crowd after each round or set of rounds is fired. As soon as the mob shows signs of dispersal he should order cease fire.

III. Under no circumstances should blank rounds be used or rounds fired in the air as warning shots. Once firing is decided upon it should be effective.

It may be noted that members of the Armed Reserve claimed that they had fired in the air, in gross violation of PSO 703 (5)(b).

IV. Aim should be kept low preferably well below the waist level and directed against the most threatening part of the mob, and

It may be noted that all the persons who died in the Thoothukudi firing died with bullet injuries to their upper torso and head.

V The police force should exercise strict restraint and self-control even under the gravest provocation and it must under no circumstances take action in a retaliatory or revengeful spirit.

PSO 703 (5) (c) The Officer in-charge of the arms squad should get the squad ready for mob firing. But it is the senior most officer who should give all the commands relating to firing.

(d) If the senior- most officer is of the opinion that it will suffice he will give the fire order to one or two individuals only. If, however, he considers that this will be insufficient and the mob will over power the police party he will give the word of command to one or two files the other files being held in reserve. Normally firing will commence with buckshots. The fire of each person or file will be given by the regular word of command by the officer in charge of the party.

(e) If the crowd does not disperse after buckshots are fired ball ammunition will be used. But if the crowd is in a very violent mood and has come too close to the police party, buckshots with their limited stopping power will be useless. In such circumstances ball ammunition will be used straightaway.

PSO 703 8 (a) After making sure the mob will not be unreasonable, the operation will be closed. But sufficient strength will be left behind till normalcy returns.

(b) Immediate steps should be taken to give First Aid to the injured and rush them to the hospital. Armed guards should be posed to watch the dead bodies till inquest is completed.

(c) It should be the endeavor of the police to arrest as many rioters as feasible from the spot itself. Special parties should be kept in reserve of this purpose.

(d) Police photographers should photograph every incident of mob dispersal. They should wherever available, carry movie or video cameras to capture the sequence of events and to record the identification of the rioters.

(e) Soon after the operation is over, the senior most officer will flash message and prepare situation reports with details of the operation, time and sequence of events, details of force used, ammunition spent, casualties on either side etc.

PREPARATIONS OF RIOT SCHEMES

20. The preparation of Riot Schemes which can be brought into prompt operation has proved of real value in the case of large towns. Internal security and alarm schemes presuppose a set of conditions quite different from those which obtain in the case of

communal other localized and are generally ill - suited for the latter purposes. The characteristics and details of riot schemes will necessarily vary from town to town and following items are merely illustrative of matters which may require consideration and inclusion in the scheme.

(a) the choice of headquarters of the Police and Chief Executive Officers [and of military liaison officers, if provision is made for military aid]

(b)adequate arrangements for telephonic communication and periodical testing of them. If a serious riot occurs, extra connections are of great value.

(c)arrangement for transport of police reinforcements.

(d) initial and disposition of police force, including schemes of patrols and pickets with mobile reserve. This part of the scheme should be fluid and admit of rapid change as the situation develops.

(e) division of the area likely to be affected into patrol areas and in particular, into areas capable of patrol by motor vehicles. The latter part of the scheme involves actual tests beforehand of the

streets and lanes down which motor vehicles can pass. Patrol areas should be as small as the force is available and local conditions will permit, since the more intensive patrolling can be made, the more useful that will prove.

(f) the allocation of duties and stations to particular magistrate.

(g) plans for the requisition of motor lorries and motor cars.

(h) Allocation to particular officer of the duty of requisitioning a sufficient number of town criers, who may prove invaluable in the early stages of riot for the purpose of proclaiming by beat of drum the orders of the executive authorities.

Successful implementation of Riot Scheme

21. The lack of appropriate equipment, uniform, monitoring equipment, recording equipment, public address system and public information system was apparent in the police action. The PSOs require the following for a successful implementation of a Riot Scheme:

(i) Public Address System – Use of public address system mounted on police vehicles for publishing official announcement culture and mischievous rumours, etc.

(j) keeping photographs at hand – Photographing situations have a deterrent effect on troublemakers and for pursuing investigation and prosecution.

(k) position and TV camera has the effect of drawing people to the desired place and thereby releasing crowd pressure where control becomes difficult.

(l) if military aid is locally available, the scheme should include provision for this, framed by or in consultation with the military authorities. Among other matters provision should be made for

22. In the police action at Thoothukudi, liaison with civil authorities was conspicuously absent. Medical relief for the injured was unavailable. As per the PSO, Police officers engaged and dealing with such situations or investigating offenses arising from them, must show themselves to be strictly impartial, however, the police officers engaged with actions in Thoothukudi demonstrated animosity towards the

public, and undertook punitive beatings and reprisals.

23. When a riot occurs, the Riot Scheme must be brought immediately into action. Police and the administration must ensure that neither the riot nor the riotous elements spread into the adjoining areas, or endanger life and property of those not involved in the clash. Lack of prompt firmness and decision on the part of the authorities is held to be responsible for spreading of the trouble to other parts of the town. The silence and the indecision of the District Collector Venkatesh for 100 days was owing to his incompetence and failure to attend to his duties in a responsible manner. Police are expected to undertake intensive police and pickets in the affected areas. The PSO suggests that 'a particularly valuable mode of patrol is by Jeep, a Magistrate sitting in the front seat, with two constables behind with loaded muskets. The fact that the Magistrate will give the order to fire, if necessary, soon becomes known and

the frequency and unexpectedness of his visits are effective in checking sporadic assaults and murders.'

24. When clashes occur

If a clash occurs immediate and vigorous action may nip the trouble in the bud and prevent it from spreading. If it is possible to make arrests, these will have a good effect. Where the clash takes the form of mob fighting, there should be no hesitation to disperse by force or to resort to firing, if life is seriously endangered, the provisions of the law in their respect being, of course, observed. Procrastinating and feeble parleying for long periods often leads to the heightening of tension and worsening of the situation. This is frequently so because lack of prompt firmness and decision is interpreted as weakness and vacillation on the part of the authorities, which it frequently actually is.

(a) Measures to put down disturbance

Whatever measures may be taken disorder may obtain a firm foothold before the necessary forces can be obtained to stamp it out. Ordinarily, the trouble will then assume the form of a gang attack in localities (a) where one party is weak and the police or troops are inadequate to stop them, or (b) 'kill and run when the police or troops are sufficient to stop gang attacks. Looting and arson will often be features of this stage.

(b) The measures which have proved of value at this and subsequent stages are:

(i) Orders under section 144, Cr.P.C in so far as it is possible to enforce them, e.g., curfew orders, prohibition in carrying of lathis etc.

(ii) Early instructions to Magistrate to give orders to fire if the circumstances justify such orders under the law of self-defence or under chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. The proclamation by bat of drum or through loud speakers of the fact that such instructions have been issued often has a deterrent effect, even though the occasions or opportunities for resort to firing may be very few.

POOR USE OF EQUIPMENT

25. The firing of tear gas both by the crew manning Vajra Riot Control vehicle, and individuals holding teargas guns at the 3rd Mile Bridge is in

patent Violation of the PSO. Particularly, it is violative in that the PSO requires that there should be

PSO 419. Tear Smoke Squad – A Tear Smoke Squad will consist of 2 sections one Head Constable and six Constables attached to each. The Squad will be attached to the headquarters wing of the District Armed Reserve and will be under the control of the Headquarters Reserve Sub- Inspectors.

26. They should have been trained as per PSO 420 for 3 months in the use of tear-gas ammunition and equipment. In fact, had they been trained as required, they would not have made common mistakes such as not identifying wind speed, wind direction, the area to be covered, and the time within which the area needs to be covered. Failure to make a proper assessment leads to needless chemical exposure and failure to ensure proper dispersal of the unlawful assembly.

FAILURE TO BE IN PROPER UNIFORM, AND DISPLAY RANK AND NAME

27. It was found that the armed reserve contingent was not in uniform. They were dressed informally in T shirts, without shoes, insignia and caps. They had been serving lunch just a few minutes prior to firing on the public.

PSO 705 requires that everyone who takes part in mob operation should be in uniform provided with helmets, shields and gas masks.

28. Further, the armed reserve vehicles was not marked and there was no indication either on the officers or the vehicle that they were going to open fire. Indeed, they had been earlier identified as serving lunch in clear violation of PSO 409.

PSO 409. Ordinary Duties of the District Armed Reserve – (3) (a) The district Armed Reserve shall furnish parties for preserving order at festivals and large public assemblies and for maintaining peace when disturbance is anticipated.

(b) The employment of the Reserve Police on festival bandobust duty should, however, be restricted as much as possible. When it is found necessary to send a party of Armed Reserve police to a festival, they

should be kept apart as a reserve to be used in case of emergency and should not be employed on isolated duties.

The failure of the Armed Reserve to appear in uniform for their duty, and failure of the commanding officers to ensure proper formation and uniform is in violation of the following PSOs.

PSO 410. Emergency Strength – (1) A minimum 'Emergency strength' will be laid down for each Armed Reserve and it must always be available and ready for immediate action.

(2) Men of the Armed Reserve for duty on emergency shall be deputed in complete sub – formations – platoons, sections or half – sections or half sections as the situation to be dealt with may require.

PSO 411. Duties of the personnel of the District Armed Reserve – (5) Orderly Reserve Sub – Inspector –

(g) he shall depute all escorts or parties of men and issue passports to them and note departure and arrival of all escorts.. He shall inspect all men going out on escort and other duty both before they go on, and after they return from such duty.

The Superintendent of Police and officers under his command, police personnel and personnel of the Armed Reserve were untrained for the various aspects of crowd control and dispersal of unlawful assemblies.

PSO 704. Training (a) All officers should be taught the legal requirements of the operation and be given demonstration in mob operation when they assemble at the District Headquarters or their monthly meeting.

(b) Officers and men should be given adequate target practice and should be trained of the different effects of buck shots and bullets have on a riotous mob.

The entire Armed Reserve should be trained in teargas drill. They should be able to use gas in various conditions of wind.

PSO 407. How to be armed – (1) when called out for duty connected with the maintenance of peace, the Reserve Sub- Inspector of an Armed Reserve shall be armed with a pistol. Head Constables, Naiks and men may preferably limit their weapons to lathis only, an addition to tear-smoke carried by the special tear-smoke squad.

(3) if the carrying of rifles is deemed essential, the mob control parties will ensure that they have at least two men armed with muskets who will carry both buck shot and ball ammunition in alternate pouches.

PSO 408. Organization and Formation of Armed Reserves – (1) each Armed Reserve will be treated as a company which will consist of the headquarters wing comprising as specialists like motor transport staff, armourers, carpenters, tailors and orderlies and regular platoons each under a Reserve Sub – Inspector. A platoon will consist of four sections and a section will consist of one Head Constable, one Naik and 12 constables including two constables for vacancy reserve. The headquarter wing will have its own vacancy reserve.

(2) (a) A Reserve Inspector will be the Company Commander. A platoon will be under the command of a Reserve Sub – Inspector, a section under the command of a Head Constable and a half section under the command of a Naik or Lance Naik.

(b) The Deputy Inspector's General platoon will be under the command of the Reserve Inspector but will for a separate platoon under a separate Reserve Sub- Inspector.

LACK OF EQUIPMENT AND PROPER INSIGNIA

29. Private ambulance run by TMMK helped the injured and the dead to reach Nallathambi Hospital opposite the Collector's office, and from there to the General Hospital. Other injured and dead were carried in two-wheelers to the Government Hospital including on three wheelers used by persons with disabilities. Stationing of police bikes and vehicles at random places and leaving them vulnerable is violative of the following PSO, and primarily responsible for them being set ablaze and/ or toppled. PSO 705 requires that the operation should be supported by a First Aid Box and an ambulance. Other equipment and ammunition to be available are:

PSO 705. Equipment and ammunition –

(c) Two different types of riot flags should be prepared, one carrying the general warning to be given before the commencement of mob operation and the second carrying the warning to be given before opening fire.

(d) Battery operated megaphones and one or two bugles to call the attention of the mob should be available.

(e) Wind screen glasses of the police vehicles should be provided with at least one guard. All vehicles should be assembled in a single place and placed under an armed guard.

(f) mike - fitted vehicles and sufficient number of walkie-talkies sets should be made available at the spot.

DRILL AND TRAINING MANUAL FOR THE USE OF THE
MADRAS POLICE

30. As per Clause -23 of Chapter -XIII, minimum force has to be used in the first instance while dealing with a riotous mob and has to be increased to the maximum by successive and definite steps as the situation dictates, avoiding the necessity of opening fire until all other measures have been tried. The object of the officer-incharge of the police party dealing with the situation must therefore be to keep the crowd on the move and to break up any small collections immediately they occur.

(JSP Tr. S. SelvaNagarathinam failed to handle the situation and did not take any steps to break up / disperse

the small collection of people gathered near "Our Lady of Snow Basilica")

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BEFORE THE
COMMENCEMENT OF FIRING AS PER CLAUSE-23 OF
CHAPTER -XIII

31. A Platoon must consist of four sections. Three Lathi Sections and one Rifle Section.

- I. Riot flag should be taken when a police party is called out in apprehension of disturbance and before tear gas is used or dispersal by lathi is made or firing is resorted to, should hoisted in a position from which the inscriptions on clearly visible to the mob.
- II. The Right hand side man of No. 1 Section of the officer in-charge has to warn the mob. A long note should be sounded on the bugle, or if no bugle is available on the whistle, before the mob is warned in order to draw attention to the warning. Then he has to warn the mob with megaphone.
- III. It should be ensured that riot flag hoisted and the inscriptions are clearly visible to the mob.
- IV. If the mob refuse to disperse, then the officer has to specify particular men or particular files of the rifle

section to open fire. He has to also specify the target (leaders of the mob etc.)

V. For example a fire order has to be made as follows:

“Right hand man (tapping his shoulder);

Man in red shirt with stick (pointing at him);

One round – fire”

VI. If there is any sign of retreating or dispersing the fire should be stopped immediately. Only the absolute minimum force should be employed. Under no circumstances should a warning shot be fired in the air nor should the fire be directed over the heads of the crowd. Aim should be kept low and directed against the most threatened part of the crowd. The greatest care should be taken not to fire upon persons separated from the crowd. Firing should cease the instant that it is no longer necessary.

VII. Soon after dealing with the mob, the officer should ensure that casualties are looked after and given necessary aid. Serious casualties should be sent by the quickest means to nearest hospital.

VIII. All commands to the police are to be given by the officer in command of party. The police are not, on any account, to fire excepting by word of commanding of their officer.

IX. Officers commanding police parties, on every occasion, when employed in the suppression of a riot

or enforcement of the law, has to ensure that the fullest warning is given to the mobbing a clear and distinct manner, before any order is given to use gas or lathi or fire arms. They should also explain before hand to the people opposed to them that in the event of the police party opening fire, the fire will be effective.

32.BPRD HANDBOOK ON CROWD CONTROL

1. The Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD) in 2016 published a handbook on Crowd Control which talks in detail about dealing with violence in public protests and unlawful assembly BPRD is the government's research arm for all issues related to policing and is an organization under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The handbook has detailed information & guidelines on crowd control along with relevant anecdotes and examples.

2. The police should first resort to psychological control methods to disperse the crowd having regard to nature and tendency. A few psychological methods include persuasive appeals, humorous and witty remarks, confident police attitude, making the crowd wait, and unexpected distractions. However, the usage of such methods should be such that it does not induce panic in the crowd.

3. Only if psychological tactics fail, police can resort to using force for dispersal.
4. The handbook further suggests that if psychological methods of persuasion, warning and advice don't work and the use of force is unavoidable, the police should use the minimum possible force so that damage to life and property is least.
5. Dispersal of unlawful assembly is to be done as per sections 129 to 132 of Cr.P.C.
6. Sections 129 to 131 of chapter X of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) deal with maintenance of public order and tranquility which is about the dispersal of assembly by use of civil force, armed forces and their powers Section 132 has details with respect to protection against prosecution for acts done under these sections.
7. Section 129 authorizes only Executive Magistrate, Officer-in-charge of a police station or anyone at the rank of Sub -Inspector or above, to command the dispersal of any unlawful assembly. If the assembly still does not disperse or does not show any intention to do so, then the officer can take the help of public for dispersing the assembly, or for taking action against those who are a part of it.

33. Based on the circumstances the police can make of use of force to disperse the crowd. However the following principles need to be adhered to:

1. No force should be used more than necessary
2. It should not be used as a punitive measure
3. It must cease immediately once the objective has been attained

Prior warning of usage of force needs to be given by police

Before using force, the police have to give warning to the assembly that force will be used to disperse them. If the crowd refuses, then the police can resort to force for dispersal. The intensity and manner of force that will be used depends upon the circumstances. Factors such as the strength of the crowd and their attitude are to be considered.

34. Qualifications, training and counseling:

Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that all law enforcement officials are selected by proper screening procedures, have appropriate moral, psychological and physical qualities for the effective

exercise of their functions and receive continuous and thorough professional training. Their continued fitness to perform these functions should be subject to periodic review.

35. Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that all law enforcement officials are provided with training and are tested in accordance with appropriate proficiency standards in the use of force. Those law enforcement officials who are required to carry firearms should be authorized to do so only upon completion of special training in their use.

36. In the training of law enforcement officials, Governments and law enforcement agencies shall give special attention to issues of police ethics and human rights, especially in the investigative process, to alternatives to the use of force and firearms, including the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the understanding of crowd behaviour, and the methods of persuasion, negotiation and mediation, as well as to technical means, with a view to limiting the use of force and firearms. Law enforcement

agencies should review their training programmes and operational procedures in the light of particular incidents.

37. Governments and law enforcement agencies shall make stress counseling available to law enforcement officials who are involved in situations where force and firearms are used.

Reporting and review procedures:

38. Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that superior officers are held responsible if they know, or should have known, that law enforcement officials under their command are resorting, or have resorted, to the unlawful use of force and firearms, and they did not take all measures in their power to prevent, suppress or report such use.

39. Obedience to superior orders shall be no defence if law enforcement officials knew that an order to use force and firearms resulting in the death or serious injury of a person was manifestly unlawful and had a reasonable opportunity

to refuse to follow it. In any case, responsibility also rests on the superiors who gave the unlawful orders.

PRECIS ON CROWD CONTROL

(BPRD, 2016)

40. Rules for the use of force

On the basis of the recommendation of a committee appointed in 1962 by the Conference of Inspectors General of Police, the following rules were evolved.

FIREARMS are used to disperse crowds only in extreme and very exceptional circumstances where there is imminent and extreme danger to life and property. The responsible police officer, whether acting under the orders of the Magistrate or independently, when considering the use of fire arms necessary, shall, unless circumstances make this impossible, warn the crowd to disperse, and only on that failing should fire with live ammunition. Orders for firing should be obtained from a Magistrate if he is present.

As soon as it appears that the use of firearms may become necessary, a detachment should be put in

readiness to take action without loss of time the moment orders are given to open fire.

The police officer will specify the number of rounds to be fired and will give precise orders to the particular men who are to fire. He shall also specify the target. The officer should ensure proper fire control. Once the decision to fire has been taken, it should be applied with maximum effect. The aim should be kept low (at the legs to avoid n injuries) and towards the most threatening part of the crowd. Fire should cease as soon as the crowd disperses.

The force armed with weapons should not be allowed to go close to the crowd could be overwhelmed and the arms snatched. While accompanying processions the armed force at the front and rear should move a little distance ahead and be the procession.

The rounds fired should be sealed immediately and the magistrate and police officer should immediately draw up a full report stating the number of rounds fired, the circumstances under which firing was resorted to, and the number of casualties.

Those injured in the police action should be given first aid and sent to hospital immediately. Other points that should be kept in mind are;

- ❖ **Firing should be never beconducted over the head of a mob with live ammunition. This can result in injuries to innocent persons at the end of the bullet's trajectory.**
- ❖ **It also emboldens the crowd, as it feels that the law enforcing agency is hesitant about inflicting casualty on the crowd.**

Mere disobedience of orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C. does not make an assembly unlawful and attract action to disperse it.

41. Less Than Lethal Weapons

A detailed procedure for the use of force in a graduated manner was recommended by a committee set up by the Conference of Inspectors Generals of Police in 1962.

42. In India the water canon was developed by the DRDO and one of the first ones to produce was deployed in Ayodhya in the aftermath of the destruction of the Babri Masjid.

43. A combination of a high pressure water jet from the water canon with petroleum jelly spread on the road was one of the most effective methods to disperse mobs in the early 1990's. the water cannon is even today an effective method to disperse demonstrators.

44. In recent times, various kinds of less than Lethal weapons were developed and used in many countries. Rubber bullets, wax bullets, plastic bullets and bean ball rounds, Ring Airfoil Projectiles (Kinetic and tear gas) and electroshock weapons such as Taser are less lethal than conventional metal bullets, and are also propelled at lower speed by using less propellant.

45. Water Canon are commonly used in crowd and riot control, for dispersal or to prevent movement on a particular position. The Israeli Defence Forces began using

Skunk Weapon for crowd control. It is a form of mist sprayed from a water cannon, which leaves a terrible odour of rot or sewage on whatever it touches, and does not wash off easily.

46. Likewise pepper spray, Mace spray, sleep gas, and Electroshock Weapons are the modern equipments used in various countries to control the crowd.

47. The .12 bore shot gun is emerging as a multi-purpose delivery weapon. The pump action shot gun with a magazine holding 4 to 12 cartridges, is emerging as a favoured weapon for a less than lethal approach to crowd control. It can fire a variety of rounds – tear gas, pepper bags, bean bag and even rubber baton rounds. The wide and versatile range of ammunition which can be fired from a .12 bore shot gun makes it an ideal delivery weapon for a less than lethal approach to crowd control.

HANDLING OF LAW AND ORDER PROBLEMS BY
POLICE AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

48. After Sepoy Mutiny in 1857, British rulers in India set up civil police organization in India in 1861 by enacting Police Act - 1861. For police administration in India, they formulated Police Standing Orders (PSOs) to guide police on general administration, maintenance of L & O, crime prevention and investigation, training to police personnel and other connected matters. Most of the provisions in PSOs, which are professional in nature, are still followed even after independence.

49. For better control over the administration of India under their command and to improve the performance of police in India, British rulers appointed Police Commission in 1902 and based on its recommendation, Intelligence unit was started functioning as a part of Criminal Investigation Department (CID).

50. In the recent times, police force has deviated from its professional way of approach in its functioning as mentioned below:

1. Superintendent of Police of a district is mainly responsible for the maintenance of Law and Order in the district. To ensure it, he has to supervise his subordinate police officers, police men and women, and to guide them. Of late, some of the District SPs are of the view that it is the responsibility of Dy.S.Ps and S.H.Os to maintain law and order in their respective jurisdiction. They do not evince interest in doing field work along with their subordinates and they think that their job is to attend office and to give instructions to their subordinates.

2. It is expected that Superintendent of Police of a district should have personal knowledge about sensitive villages in his jurisdiction. He has to visit those villages during peace time and to cultivate good source of contacts for carrying out professional police work. He has to ensure that his Dy.S.Ps and Inspectors (SDOs & SHOs) should also visit sensitive villages in their respective jurisdiction frequently and to develop sources, who will share matters of importance at ground level for better policing. This system has been prescribed in the Police Standing

Orders as 'village visits by police officers'; but, it is not professionally followed by most of the ranks in the police Department.

3. Whenever SP receives grievance petitions from public, he has to look into the merit of those petitions and do justice on merit without delay. He has to ensure that all his Dy.S.Ps and Inspectors are also doing justice in petition enquiry. Prompt act of attending grievance petitions from public will strengthen the hands of police while handling law and order issues. Unfortunately, adequate priority has not been given by police at Police Station level as well as by the district SP. Negligence of police in petition enquiry has created a gap between general public and the police, and thereby, police could not enjoy support from the public at the time of handling crucial law and order issues.

4. Efficient District Special Branch staff will not only collect advance intelligence at village level; but, they will do spade work to dilute and dissipate any kind of agitation at district level. But the system of giving periodical professional training to SB staff also gets least importance.

5. There is a mind set in the Police Department that mobilizing more police force is the way to handle law and order situation. In reality, mobilizing more

police force without proper leadership and plan of work will have negative impact and it will aggravate the law and order situation.

6. There is a trend of mobilizing more than a dozen IPS officers, hundreds of Subordinate police officers and a few thousand police men and women throughout the State for bandobust duty on sensitive issues in districts. Many of them do not have adequate knowledge about the law and order issue for which they are drafted for bandobust and some of them are not interested to perform duty. They used to come for duty as if it is a temple festival bandobust, without adequately equipped themselves with riot gears. Above all, they do not have any contact with local people, where they have been posted to perform duty.

7. There are instances in the past that lack of professional knowledge of subordinate police officers and police men had aggravated the Law and Order situation.

8. There was instances in the recent past wherein senior police officers deserted from the spot, leaving the situation at the hands of subordinate police officers, who mishandled the situation, causing loss of life.

9. There is a standard protocol for mobilizing police force for major law and order bandobust duty.

Police strength has to be grouped into 'sections' and each section shall have a leader and so on. They should wear riot gears. There should be tear gas and fire arms with the strength draft for duty at a particular location. There is a specific protocol for issue and use of tear gas and firearms, which is mentioned in Drill and Training Manual. To familiarize such protocol, every month 'Mob Operation Parade' has to be conducted for both local police personnel and also those in Armed Reserve. Lack of knowledge and training in handling mob and in using fire arms result in causality while dispersing crowd.

10. Lack of coordination from police force coming for bandobust from other districts normally surface and it will have its adverse effect while handling law and order problem.

11. Police force coming from other districts will not take any responsibility in handling crowd control, as it may sometimes go against them resulting in dispensary action and even criminal proceedings also.

12. There is an impression among subordinate police officers and men that senior officer in charge of bandobust will not take responsibility, if any untoward incident happens during the course of

crowd control. This trend prevails in the police force throughout the state.

13. In a planned mass agitation based on policy matters, the State Intelligence (SBCID) has to play a vital role. Their role will not stop by sending alert messages to SP about the agitation. They have to appraise the State Government about the ground reality, enabling the Government to take a stand to solve the issue.

14. There should be a critical review after each major L &O bandobust. 'What went wrong and why?' and 'Lessons learned' need to be analysed. Instead of doing so, concentration is only on overcoming criminal cases/ enquiry instituted against police personnel on duty.

51. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1.Training: Periodical training to police officers, men and women on crowd control and use of fire arms.

2.Suitability of police personnel drafted for L & O duty: Mobilizing police personnel working in special units, who do not have experience in handling L & O situation, will make the situation worst. Suitability of police personnel drafted for L & O bandobust to be ascertained.

3.Riot gear: All police personnel drafted for L & O bandobust must wear riot gears to protect themselves and thereby, they do not create awkward situation of running away from the spot fearing stone pelting by the mob.

4. Fire arms: There is a protocol for issue of fire arm and ammunitions to a police personnel. He / she cannot transfer the possession of fire arm and ammunitions from his/her possession to someone else just like that. The protocol of possession of fire arms and use of fire arms has to be taught to police personnel of all ranks.

5. Senior police officer in charge of bandobust at a particular location shall remain with his team and shall not allow police force under his command to act independently.

6. Correct assessment of ground reality by the State Intelligence and reporting of the same to the Government for taking appropriate decision. (In Sterlite issue, if the Government announced the decision in advance, there would not be any untoward incident.)

7. Neglecting regular police work: Corrupt and unfair in regular police work will make the general public to act against police when they get an opportunity.

8. Inexperienced officers holding the post of Range DIG and Zonal IGP will be a strength for the agitators.

9. A Retired police Sub-Inspector by name S. Dennis who have served in the police department for 32 ½ long years has come forward with the petition pointedly the attention of this Commission the acts of commission and omission on the part of the police personnel which led to loss of 13 lives and gun shot injuries as many as 43

protesters as also the members of the public in the police firing on 22.05.2018. As a matter of fact the petition had been though addressed to the Commission sent to the Government wherefrom it has been forwarded to this Commission. The various aspects referred to in the petition have been dealt with by this Commission in the report. This Commission deems it fit to annex it and accordingly this will form part of IVth Volume.

10. This Commission in the course of its enquiry laid its hands literature on a vehicle known as police special purpose vehicle (PSPV). It is a state – of – the art highly effective vehicle specially designed for the police and paramilitary forces intended for dealing with mob violence. It has a number of salient features and if these vehicles are added to the equipment of the police it would certainly go a long way in improving the efficiency of the police force. Inbuilt in the vehicle are Multi Tube Shell tear gas Launcher (MTSL) and Public Address system which enable the police to address the crowd and deploy troops accordingly. The

Vehicle provides All round vision Observation Hatch to the commander to assess the situation and act accordingly.

11. There is yet another vehicle which would be of great utility for the police and it is riot control vehicle mode RCU 6000. For the sake of convenience this Commission would consider it fit to annex the requisite literature. It is upto the Government to analyse the pros and cons, examine the feasibility of acquiring these vehicles and make them form part of police infrastructure.

12. This Commission has down loaded from the internet a literature on "Riot Control Project" of MTS security consulting and project management (2021). This Commission annexes it to form part of this volume so that the Government may examine the Riot Control Project and utilize it to the extent necessary if deemed fit.

13. This Commission annexes an article dated 26.04.2022 published in "Dinamani" titled "பார்வையாளர் பணியிரடைப்பயிற்சியும்,

பணித்திறன்மேம்பாடும்" penned by Tr. P. Kannappan, I.P.S., a retired police officer.

52. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

1. The Commission wishes to thank the journalists and other independent witnesses who appeared before the Commission against heavy odds and at grave personal risk and gave a firsthand account of what happened on the unfortunate day, without their evidence it would not have been possible to make any headway in the inquiry.

2. The Commission wishes to thank the elite cream of the society consisting of bureaucrats past and present, and prominent people with real concern for society, for their very enlightened guidance, suggestions and inputs, which have been incorporated in the fourth part of this report dealing with measures to prevent recurrence of such incidents.

3. The Commission is particularly thankful to Thiru S.F. Akbar, Retired District Judge and former State Information Commissioner. The Commission in its endeavor

to get the correct factual matrix had to examine as many as 1048 witnesses and got marked 1544 exhibits through those witnesses. The voluminous materials thus gathered over a period of 3 long years of strenuous enquiry had to be analyzed by sifting the chaff from the grain. This was indeed an uphill task to be performed. This is besides the arduous task of drawing conclusions from the materials available on record. In this exacting exercise Thiru S.F Akbar worked shoulder to shoulder with this Commission in shaping the final report founded on proven facts – tested in the crucible of legal principles besides prudence and diligence. The Commission places on record his immense contribution enriched by his vast experience, legal bent of mind and above all fundamental fairness, in an effort to do Justice to all concerned.

4. The Commission is very much thankful to Tr. I. Pandurangan Special Officer/District Judge (Retired) for his dedication and deep involvement from the inception of the enquiry particularly in bringing out the Tamil version of the final report.

5. The Commission also thanks Tr. Udayan, Investigating officer / District Judge (Retired) for his contribution for the conduct of the enquiry.

6. The assistance derived by the Commission from Thiru C.Arulvadivel @ Sekar, Counsel for the Commission appointed to represent the 'aggrieved/affected' persons was immense and it reduced the burden on the Commission to a remarkable extent.

7. The Commission thanks Tr. Chandra Sekar and Tr. K.S. Prabhakaran Advocates for their excellent and able representation on behalf of the police.

8. The Commission expresses its appreciation for the dedicated, tireless, prompt and swift services rendered by Tmt. Amudha Section Officer. As a matter of fact she ably and willingly shouldered dual responsibilities of both Secretary of the Commission (since vacant) and in her capacity as Section Officer without any demur.

9. Thiru M. Jagadeesh who had worked as one of the two typists was true and sincere to all the responsibilities

entrusted to him. His knowledge of computer operation was of immense help to this Commission.

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12. Tr. Jagadeesan and Tr. Daniel Peter who worked as Assistant Section Officers provided their effective services.

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காவல் மரணங்களும், போராட்டக்காரர்கள் மீதான துப்பாக்கிச் சூடும் தவிர்க்க முடியாதவையா? என்ற கேள்வி பொதுவெளியில் எழுந்துள்ளது. கடந்த அரை நூற்றாண்டு காலத்தில் தமிழ்நாட்டில் நிகழ்ந்த துப்பாக்கிச் சூடு சம்பவங்கள், காவல் மரணங்களில் கடும் விமர்சனங்களை எதிர்கொண்ட

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மீம்பவங்களில் குறிப்பிடத்தக்கவை 018-ஆம் ஆண்டில் தூத்துக்குடியில் நிகழ்ந்த துப்பாக்கிச் சூடும், 2020-ஆம் ஆண்டில் சாத்தான்குளம் ாவல்நிலையத்தில் நிகழ்ந்த காவல் ாரணங்களும் ஆகும்.

஁ரசு சொத்துகளைத் தீயிட்டு, ஁சதப்படுத்தும் போராட்டக்காரர்களின் வன்முறைச் செயல்களைக் கட்டுப்படுத்தவும், சட்டம்-ஒழுங்கைப் பராமரிக்கவும் கலவரக்காரர்கள் மீது துப்பாக்கிச் சூடு நடத்தும் அதிகாரம் காவல்துறைக்கு உண்டு. அந்த நேரத்தில் கலவரக்காரர்கள் சிலர் உயிர் இழப்பதும் உண்டு.

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தூத்துக்குடி துப்பாக்கிச் சூட்டில் உயிரிழந்த 13 பேரில் பலருக்கு துப்பாக்கி குண்டுகள் முதுகைத் துளைத்து, மார்பு வழியாக வெளிவந்துள்ளன என்றும், குறிப்பாக மாணவி ஒருவருக்கு தலையின் பின்புறத்தில் குண்டு துளைத்து, வாய்

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வழியாக வெளிவந்துள்ளது என்றும் பிரேத பரிசோதனை அறிக்கைகள் தெரிவிக்கின்றன.

சட்டம்-ஒழுங்கை சீர்குலைத்து, வன்முறையில் ஈடுபடும் கலவரக்காரர்களைக் கலைக்க ஒலி பெருக்கி மூலம் எச்சரிக்கை செய்தும், தடியடி, கண்ணீர்ப்புகை, தண்ணீர் பீய்ச்சி அடித்தல் போன்றவைகளைப்

பயன்படுத்தியும், கலவரக்காரர்கள் கலைந்து செல்லாவிட்டால், சம்பவ இடத்தில் இருக்கும் உயரதிகாரியின் அனுமதி பெற்று துப்பாக்கிச் சூடு ிடத்துவதற்கான வழிமுறைகளை கவாத்து-பயிற்சி கையேடு' ிதளிவுபடுத்துகிறது.

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'கலவரக்காரர்களைக் கலைக்க நடத்தப்படும் துப்பாக்கிச் சூட்டில், கலவரத்தில் ஈடுபடுபவர்களை அடையாளம் கண்டு, இடுப்புக்கு கீழ்பகுதியில் குண்டுபெடும்படி துப்பாக்கிச் சூடு நடத்தப்பட

வேண்டும்' என அந்த கையேடு தெளிவுபடுத்துகிறது.

தூத்துக்குடியில் நிகழ்ந்த துப்பாக்கிச் சூட்டில் இறந்தவர்கள் பலரின் முதுகில் குண்டுகள் துளைத்து, மார்பில் வெளிவந்துள்ளன என்ற தகவல், அவர்கள் அனைவரும் பயந்து ஓடும் பொழுது, முதுகில் குண்டுகள் பாய்ந்து இறந்துள்ளனர் என்ற கள நிலவரத்தை உணர்த்துகிறது. சட்டம்-ஒழுங்கைப் பராமரிக்கவும், கலவரத்தை ஒடுக்கவும் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட துப்பாக்கி சூடு எதிர்மறையான விளைவுகளை ஏற்படுத்தக் காரணம் என்ன?

PREVIOUS POST

'கலவரக் கும்பலைக் கலைக்கும் நடவடிக்கைகள்' குறித்த பயிற்சி மாதம் தோறும் காவலர்களுக்கு வழங்கப்பட்டு வந்தது. காவலர்களின் கவாத்து செய்முறைகளை ஆய்வு செய்வதற்காக காவல் உயரநிகாரிகள் வரும்பொழுதெல்லாம், கலவரக்

கும்பலைக் கலைக்கும் பயிற்சிக்கு முன்னுரிமை கொடுத்து, உயரதிகாரிகள் முன்னிலையில் அந்த பயிற்சி நடத்தப்படுகின்ற பழக்கம் நடைமுறையில் இருந்து வந்தது.

ஆனால், காவலர்களின் வேலைப்பளுவைக் காரணம் காட்டி, இந்த பயிற்சி தற்பொழுது முறையாக நடத்தப்படுவதில்லை. இதன் முக்கியத்துவத்தை காவல் உயரதிகாரிகளும் உணர்வதில்லை. வன்முறையில் ஈடுபடும் கலவரக்காரர்களை எதிர்கொள்ளும் பயிற்சி போதிய அளவிற்கு இல்லாத காரணத்தால், பாதுகாப்புப் பணியிலிருக்கும் காவலர்கள் கலவரக் கும்பலை நோக்கி கண்மூடித்தனமாக துப்பாக்கிச் சூடு நடத்துகின்ற சம்பவங்கள் தொடர்கின்றன.

PREVIOUS POST

அதே போன்று, மனித உரிமை மீறலாகவும், காவல்

அத்துமீறலாகவும் கருதப்படும் காவல் மரணங்கள் தொடர்ந்து நடைபெறுகின்றன. காவல் மரணம் நிகழும் பொழுது, மக்களிடம் வெளிப்படும் வெறுப்புணர்வை தணிப்பதற்காக, காவல் மரணங்களைத் தவிர்ப்பதற்கான அறிவுரைகளை அரசும், காவல் தலைமையகமும் வெளியிடுகின்றன. அந்த அறிவுரைகளை காவலர்கள் பின்பற்றுகிறார்களா? என்பது குறித்த கண்காணிப்பில் ஏற்படும் குறைபாடுகள் பல நேரங்களில் காவல் மரணங்களுக்கு வழி வகுக்கின்றன.

வாகன சோதனை, சந்தேக நபர்களிடம் விசாரணை போன்ற நேரங்களில் மூர்க்கத்தனமாக அடித்தால் உண்மை வெளிப்படும் என்றும், அத்தகைய வரம்பு மீறிய செயல்களால் தங்களின் அதிகாரத்தை பொதுமக்களிடத்தில் நிலைநாட்ட முடியும் என்றும் காவல்துறையில் ஒருசாரார் கருதுகின்றனர்.

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PREVIOUS POST

கல்வி கற்றவர்களின் எண்ணிக்கை அதிகரித்து வருகின்ற இக்காலத்தில், சட்டவிதிகளுக்கு உட்பட்டு காவல்துறையினர் செயல்பட வேண்டுமென்ற எதிர்பார்ப்பும், மனித உரிமை மீறல்களுக்கு எதிராகக் குரல் கொடுக்கும் சட்ட விழிப்புணர்வும் பொதுமக்களிடத்தில் தொடர்ந்து வெளிப்படுவதை காவல்துறையினர் முழுமையாக உணர்ந்து செயல்படாத நிலையைக் காணமுடிகிறது.

காவல் நிலை ஆணைகளும், முப்பெரும் குற்றவியல் சட்டங்களும், காவல் தலைமையகத்தின் சுற்றறிக்கைகளும் காவல்துறையினரை வழிநடத்திச் செல்லும் வழிகாட்டு நெறிகளாகும். இவற்றை காவல்துறையினர் பின்பற்றுவதில் ஏற்படும் குறைபாடுகள் காவல் மரணங்கள், துப்பாக்கிச் சூடு போன்ற அசம்பாவிதங்கள் நிகழக் காரணமாக அமைந்துவிடுகின்றன.

காவலர்களாகத் தேர்வு செய்யப்பட்டு பணியில் சேரும்பொழுது, அவர்களுக்கு காவலர் பயிற்சிப் பள்ளியில் ஆறு மாதகாலம் அடிப்படைப் பயிற்சி அளிக்கப்படுகிறது. அதன் பிறகு, அவர்களின் பணிக்காலம் முழுவதும் எவ்வித பணியிடைப் பயிற்சியும் இன்றி, பெரும்பாலான காவலர்கள் பணிபுரிந்து வருகின்ற நிலைதான் தற்போதைய காவல்துறையின் கள நிலவரம்.

சில ஆண்டுகளுக்கு முன்பு, இந்திய அளவில் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட ஓர் ஆய்வில், காவல்துறையின் மொத்த எண்ணிக்கையில் 6.4% காவல்துறையினர்தான் கடந்த ஐந்து ஆண்டுகளில் பணியிடைப் பயிற்சி பெற்றவர்கள் எனத் தெரியவந்துள்ளது. தமிழ்நாட்டைப் பொறுத்தவரை மூன்று மாவட்டங்களுக்கு ஒரு பணியிடைப் பயிற்சி மையம் செயல்பட்டு வருகிறது. இந்த மையங்களில்

காவலர்களுக்கும், களப்பணியாற்றும் காவல் அதிகாரிகளுக்கும் மிகக் குறுகிய கால பணியிடைப் பயிற்சி அளிக்கப்படுகிறது. இரண்டு காவல் அதிகாரிகளுடன் இயங்கிவரும் இந்த பணியிடைப் பயிற்சி மையத்தினால் அனைத்து காவலர்களுக்கும் பணியிடைப் பயிற்சி வழங்க இயலாத நிலை நிலவுகிறது. இந்த மையங்களின் செயல்திறனை மேம்படுத்துவது குறித்து அரசும், காவல் தலைமையகமும் பரிசீலனை செய்ய வேண்டும்.

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காவல் பணியில் புதிதாய் சேர்பவர்களுக்கு அடிப்படைப் பயிற்சி வழங்கும் காவல் பயிற்சி பள்ளிகள் மற்றும் கல்லூரிகள், காவல் உயர் பயிற்சியகம் (போலீஸ் அகாடமி) போன்றவற்றில் பணிபுரிபவர்கள் பொரும்பாலும் காவல்துறையைச் சார்ந்த அதிகாரிகளே. அவர்களில் பலர்

விருப்பமின்றி பணியாற்றி வருகின்ற சூழல் நிலவுகிறது.

கற்றுக் கொடுப்பதில் ஆர்வமும், போதிய அனுபவமும் உள்ளவர்களைத் தேர்வு செய்து, காவல் பயிற்சி மையங்களில் பணியமர்த்தப்பட வேண்டும். காவல் பயிற்சி மையங்களில் பணிபுரிபவர்களுக்கு சிறப்புப் பயிற்சியும், பிற மாநிலங்களில் அமைந்துள்ள சிறந்த காவல் பயிற்சி மையங்களைப் பார்வையிட்டு, காவல்துறையின் பணித்திறனை மேம்படுத்துவதற்கான சிறந்த வழிமுறைகளை அறிந்து கொள்வதற்கான வாய்ப்பும் வழங்கப்பட வேண்டும்.

PAARVALS POST

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ஒன்றரை நூற்றாண்டுகளுக்கு மேலாக நம்நாட்டில் செயல்பட்டுவரும் காவல்துறையின் உள்கட்டமைப்பில் களப்பணியாற்றும் காவலர்களுக்கும், அதிகாரிகளுக்கும்

தொடர்பயிற்சி அளிக்கும் முறை வடிவமைக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. காவல் நிலையங்களில் காவலர்களின் தினசரி வருகைப் பதிவை சரிபார்க்கும் 'ரோல் கால்' நேரத்தின் ஒரு பகுதி காவலர்களின் பணி தொடர்பான அறிவுரைகள் வழங்குவதற்காக ஒதுக்கீடு செய்யப்பட்டுள்ளது. அண்மை காலமாக இந்த முறை தவிர்க்கப்பட்டு வருகிறது.

மாவட்ட காவல் காண்காணிப்பாளர்கள் நடத்தும் மாதாந்திர குற்ற ஆய்வுக் கூட்டங்களும், உயரதிகாரிகளின் காவல் நிலைய ஆய்வுகளும் களப்பணியாற்றும் காவல் அதிகாரிகள், காவலர்களின் பணித்திறனை மேம்படுத்தும் பயிற்சி வகுப்புகளாக இருந்துவந்தன.

PREVIOUS POST

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களப்பணியின்போது நிகழ்ந்த தவறுகளைச் சுட்டிக்காட்டி, அவை நிகழாமல் பணி செய்வதற்கான

வழிமுறைகள் அக்கூட்டங்களில் விவாதிக்கப்பட்டன. சமீப காலமாக, மாதாந்திர குற்ற ஆய்வுக் கூட்டங்களும், காவல் நிலைய ஆய்வுகளும் சம்பிரதாயத்திற்காக நடத்தப்படுகின்ற நிகழ்வுகளாக மாறிவிட்டன.

ஒரு லட்சத்திற்கும் அதிகமானவர்களை உள்ளடக்கிய தமிழ்நாடு காவல்துறையில் எண்பது சதவீதத்தினர் காவலர்கள். இவர்களில் யாரேனும் ஒருவர் செய்யும் தவறுக்கு காவல்துறையே பொறுப்பேற்க வேண்டிய சூழல் ஏற்படுகிறது. தொடர் கண்காணிப்பும், தவறு செய்பவர்களைக் கண்டறிவதும் காவல் நிர்வாகத்தின் செயல்திறனை மேம்படுத்தத் துணைபுரியும்.

பெ.கண்ணப்பன், ஐ.பி.எஸ்

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safetycatshub@gmail.com

**(26.04.2022 – ஆம் தேதிய
தினமணி நாளிதழில்**

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Tagged In service training, பணியிடைப் பயிற்சி

Previous

சீர்திருத்தத்துக்கான நேரம் இதுவே!

PREVIOUS POST

2 THOUGHTS ON “பணியிடைப் பயிற்சியும், பணித்திறன் மேம்பாடும்!”



M.CHELLIAH

28 April 2022 at 10:03 pm

என்ன நடந்து கொண்டிருக்கிறது அதனை
எவ்வாறு சீர்திருத்தலாம் என்பதை விளக்கும்
அருமையான கட்டுரை

Reply →

**G A Kannan**

28 April 2022 at 10:53 pm

காவல்துறையில் பணிபுரிபவர்களுக்கு தற்போதைய காலச்சூழலில் தாங்கள் எப்படி பணியாற்ற வேண்டும் என்ற பயிற்சி அவசியமாகத் தெரிகிறது. நேர்மை குறைந்து ஏனோ தானோ என்று செயல்படுவதால் மக்களிடம் நம்பிக்கைக் குறைபாடும் ஏற்பட்டுள்ளது.

சட்ட அறிவும் புலன் விசாரணை செய்யும் அறிவும் மிகவும் குறைவாகவே உள்ளது குறிப்பிடத்தக்கது. இவை மேம்பட தக்க முயற்சிகள் அவசியமாகின்றன.

காவலர்களின் எண்ணிக்கையை அதிகப்படுத்தி நிலவி வரும் லஞ்ச லாவண்யம் மீது அரசு கடுமையான நடவடிக்கை எடுத்தால் மட்டுமே காவல்துறை தனது பெருமையைப் பெறும். காவல்துறையினரே இதர சில துறைகளில் பணிபுரிபவர்களுக்கு லஞ்சம் கொடுக்க வேண்டிய சூழலும் உள்ளது.

காவல்துறை நேர்மையாகப் பணியாற்றும் சூழலை உருவாக்க என்னென்ன செய்ய வேண்டுமோ.. அனைத்தையும் அரசு செய்ய வேண்டும்.

Reply →**Leave a Reply***Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked **

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Email *

Website

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
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POLICE SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE (PSPV)



Mahindra
DEFENCE SYSTEMS

POLICE SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE (PSPV)

PSPV is a state-of-the-art highly effective vehicle specially designed for the police and paramilitary forces to control mobs in dense urban areas. Due to the unique design of this vehicle, it can be deployed faster and easily manoeuvred in small lanes and in congested traffic. It can also be used to carry Senior Police Officials into not troubled areas. The Commander Control Panel has been fitted with Multi Tube Shell Teargas Launcher (MTSL) and Public Address System which enables him to address the crowd and deploy troops accordingly. All-round Vision Observation Hatch has been provided for the Commander to assess the and deploy troops accordingly. All-round Vision Observation Hatch has been provided for the Commander to assess the situation.

SALIENT FEATURES

- ▶ Can move and be deployed in confined in areas where other police vehicles can not enter.
- ▶ Providing VIP security, security for sporting events, static installations and during elections.
- ▶ Ideally suited for patrolling, controlling violent demonstrations, communal strife and riots.

OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGES OF PSPV

- ▶ Mounted with Multi Tube Shell Tear Gas Launchers.
- ▶ Easy to manoeuvre in small narrow bylane and roads
- ▶ Flashing Light bar with Siren and Public Address System
- ▶ Halogen lights for conducting Night Operations
- ▶ Drinking water and tea storage facility
- ▶ Generator / High storage capacitor for maintenance of batteries and to ensure power for attached equipment
- ▶ Fire suppression material in the fuel tank
- ▶ Stretcher



VEHICLE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATINS


- ▶ Base Model - Mahindra Bolero Camper double cab fitted with fuel efficient turbo DI super engine (MDI3200 TCA)
- ▶ Quick start, New generation chassis and improved suspension, new steering geometry with reduced steering effort
- ▶ Radial tyres, higher ground clearance & greater payload.
- ▶ Durable, tough sheet metal body and rugged bumper
- ▶ Adjustable and reclining front bucket seats
- ▶ Higher fuel tank capacity for longer operating distance.



Note: In view of our policy of continuously improving our products, we reserve the right to alter specifications or designs without liability. Illustrations may not necessarily show the vehicle in its standard form.


ANNEXURE - 4

STERLITE COPPER - ROUGH PLAN OF TAMIRA-2 (IC INSPIR)



2019-1

- AREAS/PROPERTIES AFFECTED BY FIRE
BLOCKS H1, H2, G, I - THE VEHICLES AT THE PARKING LOT AT THE BASEMENT OF THESE BUILDINGS WERE PUT TO FIRE
- VANDALISED AREA / PROPERTY



TIRUNEIVELI ←

→ THEOTTHUKUDI TOWN

↑ THIS WAY UP



We Proudly Present:

RIOT CONTROL PROJECT



2021



24/10/2021

Ref: India

Dear Sir,

Re: Proposal for RIOT CONTROL project

1. General review

MTS is a leading security consulting and project management company, based in the state of Israel. The company provides security solutions and services in various fields for clients all around the world. All services carried out by highly qualified veterans from law enforcement, police, military, home front command and Israel security agencies.

All of our Instructors are veterans of the Governmental Police - Counter Terror Unit, Special Counter Terror Units & other CT units, & VIP Protection units. All of the instructors have priceless experience - both in real life CT operations, as well as training experience.

2. Company Profile

MTS is a highly professional, structured and integrated counter terrorism consulting & communication organization drawn upon a width and depth of expertise coordinated to provide maximum results at relatively short time. We exercise great care in ensuring that your required services go according to your plan. Furthermore, we provide a wide-ranging list of certified services to keep our clients satisfied, with as little hassle as possible. We have a trusted and reliable name with vast experienced managerial capabilities in the areas of security, technological advancement, and special security training and consultancy services. The company is poised and determined to proffer its services in the most prompt, qualitative,



efficient and effective manner. We combine operational proficiency with unique technology solutions based on the most advanced security doctrine & philosophy.

3. Management

Our directors and experts are all high-level officers of great repute. All of our experts and instructors have a vast and proven field experience in security and safety operations

4. Project Plan Mile Stones

STP – Short Term Plan:

- ✓ Site survey Includes identify threats gaps and recommendations.
- ✓ Build a comprehensive solution concept

MTP– Mid Term Plan:

- ✓ Training and upgrade local units and technology solutions.
- ✓ Implement the Capabilities.
- ✓ "On the job training" – training and operational escort of each unit.
- ✓ At the end of each specific training course, curriculum will be given
- ✓ Train the trainer program - Establishment a local training team in order to preserve the knowledge within the units.
- ✓ Full operational capability, integrating the equipment and technology with more significant results.

LTP – Long Term Plan:

- ✓ Building a training base for operational and tactical training
- ✓ Training and building an independent training branch





5. We provide several options:

- Provide and supply the equipment including accompanying the process – free of charge.
- Provide and supply the equipment including of assimilating the means with the local unit – free of charge.
- Provide and supply the equipment including full training and assimilating with the local unit – Price Appendix.
- Additional of train the trainers program to create local capabilities of knowledge - Price Appendix.

6. The Course

This course is programmed to train the participants for a personal high level of weapon handling, Unarmed Combat KRAV MAGA Infantry warfare & Riot Control Combat Tactics & Theoretical knowledge. During the course we will teach & train the participants to deal with a variety of RIOT control scenarios, planned & built as close as possible to real life events according to the Israeli experience.

One of the main issues of MTS Course is the mental teaching & training - that will prepare the trainees to understand Riot Control, to think in a "Riot Control manner" & to act in a "Riot Control manner".

We believe that the mental training and preparation of the officers and staff is of utmost importance & is the key for success in Riot Control situations.

The course is very demanding, both physically & mentally in order to prepare the participants for their future missions. (All of the trainees must undergo medical checkup and hold a doctor's approval).

Candidates - from whom we will choose the most fit and suitable participants for the course, in order to diminish the level of potential failure among trainees.



Purchasing (or existence) of "KRAV MAGA" Equipment is essential. Purchasing (or existence) of Riot Control equipment is essential.

The course can be suitable for any number of participants according to client demand.








7. Price Appendix

- Cost of Course 6 weeks (up to 100 Participants) - \$ 260,000 USD
- Train the trainers program 4 weeks (50 -70 Participants that will be local instructors in the end) base on participants who have successfully passed the basic course - \$ 120,000 USD












Riot Control Equipment –MTS LTD

Item	Description	Picture
Shields 50x 90cm	A clear capture shield manufactured with shatter resistant polycarbonate, is convex designed to restrain an attacker against a vertical structure without excessive force	
Riot Helmets with Visors	High impact- Resistant ABC Plastic injection shell One size fits all	
Riot Control Suit: Inner Vest + Groin Protection + Shoulder Guards + Leg Guards + Hand Protector	Armor blocks heavily shock and impact – resistant. Complete padding for maximum shock absorption. Ultra-fast Velcro fittings. Strong padding on the back. Buckled strap crotch adjustment.	
	Leather exterior Armor blocks heavily shock and impact – resistant Complete padding for maximum shock absorption. Upper & lateral foot protection. Ultra-fast fittings. Weight-	
	Armor blocks heavily shock and impact – resistant. Complete padding for maximum shock absorption. Ultra fast Velcro fittings. Separate Elbow protection plate.	



Item	Description	Picture
Leather Duty Belt	Standard leather duty belt. Designed for professionals and carries up to 10 utility pouches	
Handcuffs	Increased endurance - extreme restraint. Stainless high-grade steel manufactured handcuff	
Carrying Bag	The bag is designed to carry riot or SWAT gear and includes a separate helmet storage area. Quality construction consists of 1000 denier, water resistant Cordura nylon, heavy-duty zippers and removable nylon web shoulder strap	
Gas Masks	Head harness type mask with lightweight canister. Total field of vision: 75 % Total weight < 800g	
Whistle		
Stretchers	The features that make the TAR Compact Stretcher an ideal battlefield stretcher make it also an excellent stretcher for a wide range of EMS sectors, including Rescue and Evacuation organizations; Mass Casualty and Disaster Management; Red Cross; Fire Departments; Police; The UN; The Industry, and more.	
First Aid Kits	Includes various medicines, bandages, scissors and syringes	








Item	Description	Picture
Riot Guns	Firing any standard 38mm projectiles, (rubber projectiles, plastic projectiles, tear cartridges, etc.), this weapon is a non-lethal anti-riot gun. It's mainly adapted for dealing with crowd disturbance, illegal gathering, prisoners' riot and criminal gangs' scuffle, so as to disperse troublemakers and resume normal order.	
Rounds for RIOT guns	Short aluminum shell with rubber / plastic projectile, CS smoke emission	
On barrel white smoke grenade	CS /smoke rounds with Maximum range of 120m Safe - the absence of FOL (Fly Off Lever) means there is no risk of ammunition igniting before launching or in case it slides off the barrel, making it a safer alternative compared to the use of launched grenades	Israeli patent
On barrel CS smoke grenade	CS /smoke rounds with Maximum range of 120m Safe - the absence of FOL (Fly Off Lever) means there is no risk of ammunition igniting before launching or in case it slides off the barrel, making it a safer alternative compared to the use of launched grenades	Israeli patent
Stun Guns 100 KV	Very small & very powerful A strong electronic discharge incapacitates the assailant Has affect even through thick layers of clothing Does not leave any physical damage. A security device prevents accidental discharges	
Tactical vest	Designed for special forces and Riot Control units, light and designed to carry different type of accessories. The perfect solution for carrying equipment, One size fits all.	







Item	Description	Picture
Tear Gas Ejector	refillable High Pressure Irritant Agent Spraying Devices for the use with our Pepper- or CS-Solutions. The HR serie is specially designed for police forces and security authorities. It serves to the riot control special units maintaining and establishing law and order. 2.2 Liter Refill Unit for Tear Gas Ejector (good for 20 refills)	
Mega Phone	Hand-held megaphone with shoulder strap. With siren/horn. On/off switch and volume control. ABS. Range 0.3-0.45 miles depending on operating conditions. 25 watt	
Special Gloves	These extremely strong and durable leather gloves are especially for disturbance control. Thick foam padding on the backs is ergonomically split to improve dexterity. The .8-.9mm thick cowhide leather construction makes them extremely strong and durable	
Nomex Face Mask	Covers the face and provides heat protection as well as wind protection. One size fits all. 18 inches in length (45cm)	
Tactical Goggles	Fully ventilated frame for superior fog resistance and protection from airborne particles. Lenses wit high quality anti-scratch and anti-fog coating.	
Tactical Flashlight TL6	Tactical flashlight with lightweight non-metallic and non-conductive construction. High efficiency xenon bulb provides up to 15 hours run time.	



Item	Description	Picture
Boots	These combat boots are made according to military spec with maximum compatibility to field conditions.	
Water Reservoir 3L	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Includes HydroLink™ Modular Connection System with positive shut-off HydroLock™. • Exterior fillport for filling on the go. • Closed cell insulation and neoprene tube cover keeps water cool or warm for hours. Capacity: 100 oz (3.0 l) Dimensions: 18 in x 7.5 in x 1 in (457 mm x 190 mm x 25 mm)	
Rubber Truncheons	Police and riot officer plastic baton available in 48, cm. Long	
Telescopic Baton	Non metallic Expandable Baton Closed 23 cm. Extended 57 cm	
Stun Baton	The 300K volt stun baton by Muscle Man is a powerful defensive weapon for stunning and hitting. When used as a stun baton, it delivers a debilitating 300,000 volt shock to attackers. Used by law enforcement, security services, and in the civilian market for years, this stun gun produces a charge that will daze and disorient attackers without causing any permanent damage. A favorite among night club owners and security forces. Offers push slide on/off safety trigger switch 18 1/2 inches' long Uses four 9V batteries(not included)	



Item	Description	Picture
Spike Road Block	Fast open Road Block, with advanced tire inflation Spikes. 7.6 meters long.	
LRAD	LRAD 100X is a self-contained, hand held, portable loud hailer that outperforms all other megaphones and most permanent public address systems. LRAD is a portable communication tool that overcomes the background noise of vehicles, vessels, sirens and boisterous crowds to ensure the message is heard and clearly understood.	
Riot Control Vehicle	Type MERCEDES-BENZ 1823 AXOR model (or equivalent). 2.1 Water tank 2.2 Liquids and additives compartment 2.3 Storage lockers 2.4 Rear (pump & pump-engine) compartment 2.5 The superstructure - galvanized metal, corrosion treated. 2.6 The superstructure is mounted on the chassis; allows flexibility to prevent torsion or breakage in the tank. 2.7 The liquid compartment stores the tear gas, dyestuff systems, foam (emulsifier) system and accessories. 2.8 Storage lockers for tools, pipes, and additional accessories. The storage lockers and all compartments are w/easy access, and lockable doors. 2.9 Engine compartment - air circulation for the engine, protected from fire and stones. 2.10 Piping work, control valves, fittings, couplings, and hoses - all according to highest international standards; selection is based on different system pressure requirements. 2.11 There are no protruding parts or handles for grabbing or climbing, and all locks are flush mounted.	



Company Presentation

Riot Control Vehicle model RCU 6000

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Who we are? •

- **HOS Technology R&D Ltd.** was established in the year 2010.
- The company's center of activity is in Israel
 - Offices, R&D, Service center and installations in our HQ at Kohav Yair
 - Manufacturing plant and installations at Kibbutz Beit Alfa – at the Beit Alfa Technologies Ltd. (BAT) site.

Company's Capabilities

- Planning and performing projects in the field of vehicle engineering & modifications, including military's platform.
- As part of its growth strategy, **HOS** acquired **Beit Alfa Technologies Ltd. (BAT)** which has over 40 years of experience in the design, manufacture and supply of numerous models of Special Purpose Vehicles – Fire Fighting, Riot Control, Bomb Disposal, Armored Vehicles and Command and Control posts.
- Design & installations of improved A/C and electricity power systems for civilian and military vehicles.



Riot Control Vehicle (RCU) – General Description

The BAT Riot Control Vehicle (RCU) was developed on the concept of providing an effective, non-lethal means of controlling and dispersing potentially violent crowd gatherings, while keeping in mind the physical safety of both the vehicle's crew and the demonstrators.

In many cases, the mere presence of vehicle on the scene will be enough to prevent any violence. Its large imposing structure, coupled with its flashing lights and siren, are a deterrent to most would be rioters.

In the cases where confrontation is inevitable, the BAT riot control vehicle provides the necessary tools to put a quick end to the violence, mainly with its specially designed Jet Pulse Water Cannon System.

When used effectively, the BAT riot control vehicle will quickly disperse even the most unruly crowd, without any injury.

The BAT riot control vehicle is produced under the scrutiny of ISO 9001 (2015), using only the best materials and taking advantage of many years of experience.

Riot Control Vehicle (RCU) – General Description

The Size of the Riot Control Vehicle (RCU):

The size of the RCU depends on the capacity of the water tank which can range from 2,000L. up to 10,000L, according to customer request.

The Chassis' of the RCU's:

The RCU's can be installed and assembled on a variety of Commercial Chassis' according to the capacity of the water tank, and the designated country and customer.

The common commercial chassis' for the riot control vehicles could be Mercedes Benz (MB)



Note: the photos are for reference only.



RIOT CONTROL VEHICLE – VARIOUS MODELS



RCU 2500



RCU 3000



RCU 4500



RCU 6000



RCU 7500



RCU 9000



WORLDWIDE SALES – Riot Control Vehicles

AFRICA

- ♦ ANGOLA
- ♦ BENIN
- ♦ BURUNDI
- ♦ EQUA. GUINEA
- ♦ GABON
- ♦ IVORY COAST
- ♦ LESOTHO
- ♦ SENEGAL
- ♦ SOUTH AFRICA
- ♦ SWAZILAND
- ♦ TANZANIA
- ♦ UGANDA
- ♦ ZIMBABWE

SOUTH AMERICA

- ♦ ARGENTINA
- ♦ CHILE
- ♦ GUATEMALA
- ♦ HAITI
- ♦ HONDURAS
- ♦ MEXICO
- ♦ PERU
- ♦ URUGUAY
- ♦ BRASIL

EUROPE + CIS

- ♦ FRANCE
- ♦ GREECE
- ♦ HUNGARY
- ♦ SPAIN
- ♦ TURKEY
- ♦ ALBANIA
- ♦ AZERBAIJAN
- ♦ GEORGIA
- ♦ KAZAKHSTAN
- ♦ LATVIA
- ♦ RUSSIA
- ♦ TAJIKISTAN
- ♦ UZBEKISTAN
- ♦ CYPRUS

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

- ♦ CHINA
- ♦ INDONESIA
- ♦ SINGAPORE
- ♦ SOUTH KOREA
- ♦ SRI LANKA

MIDDLE EAST

- ♦ ISRAEL
- ♦ MFO
- ♦ UAE



Riot Control Vehicle model RCU 6000



Riot Control Vehicle model RCU 6000

WATER TANK

- Water tank capacity - 6,000 liters.
- Galvanized sheet metal 3 & 4mm thick.
- The water tank is situated high up. The outside cover is smooth with no brackets, to prevent rioters from climbing.
- Inspection manhole.
- One drain outlet at the lowest point of the tank.
- Inside the tank there will be partitions as a breakwater.
- One filling connector, 2 1/2" with coupling. Located at the rear side of the vehicle, inside the rear compartment.
- Electric level indicator (and transparent visible tube)
- Overflow pipe 4" to spill the overflow behind the rear axle.

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PUMP

- A heavy-duty centrifugal fire pump with self-priming system.
- Pump delivery - 2400 L/MIN at 10 bar.
- Fully automatic, 7 meters deep suction self-priming unit.
- All accessories needed for water pumping lakes, river, and hydrants are provided.
- Pump housing and impeller are high-grade aluminum alloy casting, seawater resistant. Pump shaft is made of stainless steel.
- The pump is driven by a separate diesel engine
- The pump is completely drainable.

PUMP ENGINE

- Air cooled Diesel engine.
- Suitable for warm and cold climate operation.
- The pump-engine is mounted at rear compartment and w/ easy service access.

Riot Control Vehicle model RCU 6000

CONTROL PANELS

Located in the driver's cabin and include the following control features:


- Electrical gauges indicating the amount of Water, Dye, Tear Gas, and Foam in the respective tanks.
- Switches for pump and pump engine operation.
- Cannon location and firing controls, with three firing modes:
 - Short pulse
 - Long pulse
 - Continuous stream
- A swivel knob to operate cannon's horizontal movements.
- Cannon elevation control - handle w/ trigger for shooting water.
- Knob selectors to activate the additives - separate knob for gas, dye and foam.
- Pressure gauge.
- Operational control for self protection systems - bottom, roof and perimeter.
- Operational control for vehicle bulldozer.
- Operational control for vehicle Halogen searching light.
- Manual operation as a backup.
- Knob - Anti freeze - Enable drainage of the water from the control valves.



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THE WATER CANNON SYSTEM MAIN FEATURES ARE:

- Operated by electrical D.C motors, equipped with precise pan & tilt motions.
- Cannon's positioning is **not** affected by jet pulse firing.
- Water pressure jet reduction mechanism to prevent fatal injury.
- Covers an operational horizontal range of approx. 270 degrees, and vertical range of (-) 15 degrees to + 50 degrees.
- Water jet range of 50-60 meters.
- Three water firing modes are available :
 - ✓ Short pulse
 - ✓ Long pulse
 - ✓ Continuous stream
- A variety of shooting mixtures - plain water, water mixed with tear gas, water mixed with dye coloring, water mixed with tear gas and dye coloring together.
- Cannon's materials - stainless steel and composite materials resistant to corrosive liquids.
- Automatic self flashing system after shooting each tear gas pulse.
- Automatic valve at the end of the cannon's barrel to prevent dripping



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SELF PROTECTION SYSTEMS

Self-protection systems operated from the control panel to secure crew and vehicle in the most violent situations.

Foam protection system - top & bottom

The foam protection system protect the vehicle's top and bottom from incendiary bottles - Molotov cocktails and other fire elements, and include:

- ✓ Foam nozzles (6) on top of the vehicle
- ✓ Foam nozzles underneath the vehicle (2) and in the wheel houses (4)



Side and Rear Tear Gas (or Pepper Spray) nozzles:

Teargas nozzles mounted on each side (2) front (3) and the rear (1) of the RCU (total of 8 nozzles), to prevent rioters approaching the vehicle.



Windows sprayers:

Water sprayers mounted above each window and front windshield for cleaning

Positive-Pressure System:

A positive-pressure system prevents gas penetration into the cabin.


Riot Control Vehicle model RCU 6000

ADDITIVES TANKS

The additive tanks are made of stainless steel for resistance to corrosive materials, and have the following volume:

- Foam tank – 100L.
- Tear gas (pepper spray) tank – 60L.
- Dye tank – 60L.

The tanks include electric level indicators located the control panel.



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PROTECTION GRILLS

The windshield, side windows, exterior lighting, Loudspeaker and radiators are protected by demounted grill protection.

The front windshield's grill protection is controlled from inside the cabin.





ADDITIONAL ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS

- ▶ Three-tone electronic siren with a public address system.
- ▶ Two blue Beacon lights (or light bar) on the roof of the driver cabin.
- ▶ Halogen search light parallel to the water cannon
- ▶ Halogen lights on the rear side of the vehicle

Note: All the lighting and signaling will be according to customer request and comply with the traffic regulations.

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FRONT BULLDOZER

- Front bulldozer mounted in the front of the vehicle.
- Clearing roads and burning obstacles, vehicles and Other items.
- Operated by Electro-Hydraulic power system
- Controlled by the secondary control panel in the driver's cabin.

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FRONT BUMPER WATER/FOAM CANNON (OPTION)

- The front bumper Water/Foam Cannon is made of light alloy to resist any corrosive material.
- Remote-controlled from inside the cabin by separate control panel.

Performances:

- Water or water/foam solution
- Output: 500-750 L/min at 10 bar.
- Throw range: up to 20-25 m
- Rotation: 170 degrees (85 degrees each side).

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EXTRACTABLE SHIELDS - OPTION

- The RCU is equipped with extractable shields on both sides of the vehicle.
- The aim of the extractable shields is to protect the policemen walking aside of the RCU from stones and other objects thrown at them.
- It's possible to open the shields on two sides or one side only.

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TECHNICAL LITERATURE

Complete documentation is delivered with the vehicle; both operational and maintenance manuals are included.

TRAINING

- Training is given at customer's site for police personnel.
- Training includes a complete live practice in demonstration and hands-on operation of the riot control systems.
- Technical training of staff to enable solving basic technical problems.
- Technical Training - vehicles' and riot control system maintenance.



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THANK YOU!



Technology
R&D



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சுருக்கம்

விசாரணை ஆணையம் - 22.05.2018 ஆம் நாள் நடந்த துப்பாக்கிச் சூட்டின் விளைவாக இறப்பு, காயங்கள் ஏற்பட்டதற்கான காரணங்கள், தழ்நிலைகள் குறித்தும், தூத்துக்குடியிலும் அதன் அருகாமைப் பகுதிகளிலும் சட்டம் மற்றும் ஒழுங்கு சீர்குலைவுகள் காரணமாக பொதுச் சொத்துக்கள், தனியார் சொத்துக்கள் ஆகியவற்றிற்கு ஏற்படுத்தப்பட்ட சேதம் உள்ளிட்ட பிந்தைய நிகழ்வுகள் குறித்தும் விசாரிப்பதற்கு, 1952 ஆம் ஆண்டு விசாரணை ஆணையச் (மத்தியச் சட்டம் 60/1952) சட்டத்தின் கீழ் அமைக்கப்பட்ட மாண்புமிகு நீதிபதி திருமதி அருணா ஜெகதீசன் விசாரணை ஆணையம் - விசாரணை ஆணையத்தின் முடிவுகள் - ஆணைகள் பிறப்பிக்கப்படுகிறது.

பொது (மிக.)த் துறை

அரசாணை எண்.SS II/320-16/2022

நாள்: 17.10.2022

படிக்கவும்:

- பார்வை: 1. அரசாணை (நிலை) எண்.368, பொது (சட்டம் & ஒழுங்கு F)த் துறை, நாள் 23.05.2018.
2. அரசாணை (நிலை) எண்.392, பொது (சட்டம் & ஒழுங்கு D)த் துறை, நாள் 31.05.2018.
3. அரசாணை (3டி) எண்.74, வருவாய் மற்றும் பேரிடர் மேலாண்மைத் துறை, நாள் 17.05.2021.
4. அரசாணை (நிலை) எண்.289, பொது (சட்டம் & ஒழுங்கு F)த் துறை, நாள் 26.05.2021.

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ஆணை:

மேலே பார்வை ஒன்றில் படிக்கப்பட்ட அரசாணையில், 22.05.2018 அன்று சில நபர்களுக்கு மரணமும், சிலருக்குக் காயங்களும் ஏற்படும் வகையில் துப்பாக்கிச் சூடு நடத்தியதற்கான காரணங்கள் மற்றும் தழ்நிலைகள், அதனையடுத்து பொது மற்றும் தனியார் சொத்துக்களுக்குச் சேதம் ஏற்படுத்தியது உள்ளிட்ட சட்ட ஒழுங்கு சீர்குலைவு காரணமாக தூத்துக்குடி, அதனைச் சுற்றியுள்ள பகுதிகளில் ஏற்பட்ட

நிகழ்வுகள் குறித்து விசாரிப்பதற்கு, 1952 ஆம் ஆண்டு விசாரணை ஆணையச் (மத்தியச் சட்டம் 60/1952) சட்டத்தின் கீழ் அமைக்கப்பட்ட விசாரணை ஆணையத்தின் தலைவராக, நீதிபதி திருமதி அருணா ஹெகதீசன் அவர்கள் நியமிக்கப்பட்டார். மேற்சொன்ன விசாரணை ஆணையத்தின் ஆய்வு வரம்புகள் பின்வருமாறு:

- I. 22.05.2018 ஆம் நாள் நடந்த துப்பாக்கிச் சூட்டின் விளைவாக இறப்பு, காயங்கள் ஏற்பட்டதற்கான காரணங்கள், தழ்நிலைகள் குறித்தும், தூத்துக்குடியில் சட்டம் மற்றும் ஒழுங்கு சீர்குலைவுகள் காரணமாக பொதுச் சொத்துக்கள், தனியார் சொத்துக்கள் ஆகியவற்றிற்கு ஏற்படுத்தப்பட்ட சேதம் உள்ளிட்ட பிந்தைய நிகழ்வுகள் குறித்தும் விசாரணை செய்வதற்காகவும்;
- II. தழ்நிலைகளுக்கு ஏற்றவாறு தகுந்த உரிய காவலர் படை பயன்படுத்தப்பட்டதா என்பது குறித்தும், துப்பாக்கிச்சூடு நடத்துவதற்கு முன்னர் உரிய அனைத்து முன்னெச்சரிக்கை நடவடிக்கைகளும் கடைபிடிக்கப்பட்டனவா என்பதைக் கண்டறிவதற்காகவும் ;
- III. காவல் துறையினர் அத்துமீறி செயல்பட்டுள்ளனரா என்பதையும் அவ்வாறெனில் மேற்கொள்ள வேண்டிய நடவடிக்கை குறித்து உறுதியாய் அறிவதற்கும் ;
- IV. இதுபோன்ற நிகழ்வுகள் வருங்காலத்தில் மீண்டும் நிகழாமல் இருப்பதற்கு தகுந்த நடவடிக்கைகளை பரிந்துரைப்பதற்காகவும் அமைக்கப்பட்டது.

2. மேலே பார்வை இரண்டில் படிக்கப்பட்ட அரசாணையில், இறந்தவர்களின் உறவினர் / சட்டப்பூர்வ வாரிசுகள் 13 பேருக்கு தலா ரூ.20 லட்சமும், பலத்த காயம் அடைந்த 40 நபர்களுக்கு தலா ஐந்து லட்சம் ரூபாயும் மற்றும் லேசான காயமடைந்த 64 நபர்களுக்கு தலா ரூ.15 லட்சம் இழப்பீடு / நிதியுதவியும் அளிப்பதற்கு ஒப்புதல் அளிக்கப்பட்டது.

3. மேலே பார்வை மூன்றில் படிக்கப்பட்ட அரசாணையில், மேற்சொன்ன சம்பவத்தில் இறந்த / பாதிக்கப்பட்ட 17 நபர்களின் குடும்பத்தில் ஒருவருக்கு, அவர்களின் கல்வித் தகுதியின் அடிப்படையில் வேலைவாய்ப்பு வழங்கி ஆணைகள் வழங்கப்பட்டன.

4. விசாரணை ஆணையம் 14.05.2021 அன்று அதன் இடைக்கால அறிக்கையை அளித்தது. இடைக்கால அறிக்கையிலுள்ள பரிந்துரைகளின் அடிப்படையில், மேலே பார்வை நான்கில் குறிப்பிட்டுள்ளவாறு, i) கலவரத்தில் ஈடுபடாத நபர்கள் மீது பதிவு செய்யப்பட்ட 38 வழக்குகளைத் திரும்பப் பெறுவதற்கும், ii) போராட்டத்தின் போது காவல் துறையினரால் கைது செய்யப்பட்டுக் காவலில் வைக்கப்பட்ட 93 நபர்களுக்கு, அந்நபர்கள் மற்றும் அவர்களின் குடும்ப உறுப்பினர்கள் அனுபவித்த மன வேதனைகளின் பொருட்டு ரூ.1,00,000/- நிதியுதவி அளித்தும், iii) பிணையத்தில் விடுவிக்கப்பட்டு வெளியே வந்து, போராட்டத்தில் ஈடுபட்டதாகத் தெரிவித்து, காவல் துறையினரால் கைது செய்யப்பட்டு, பாளையங்கோட்டை மத்தியச் சிறையில் அடைக்கப்பட்டு, பின் 30.05.2018 அன்று இறந்த திருபரதராஜ் என்பவரின் தாயாருக்கு ரூ.2,00,000/- நிதியுதவி அளித்தும், iv) திரும்பப் பெற தகுதியுள்ள 38 வழக்குகளில் தொடர்புடைய நபர்களின் உயர்கல்னி மற்றும் வேலைவாய்ப்புக்காக "தடையில்லாச் சான்றிதழ்" வழங்கியும் ஆணைகள் வெளியிடப்பட்டன.

5. விசாரணை ஆணையம் 18.05.2022 அன்று ஆங்கிலத்திலும் 06.06.2022 அன்று தமிழிலும் அறிக்கைகளை அரசிடம் அளித்துள்ளது. மேற்சொன்ன விசாரணை ஆணையம், விசாரணையின் போது பதிவு செய்யப்பட்ட வாய்மொழி மற்றும் ஆவண ஆதாரங்களைக் கவனமாகப் பரிசீலித்த பின்னர், ஆய்வு வரம்புகள் மீதான அதன் முடிவுகளைப் பின்வருமாறு வழங்கியுள்ளது :-

ஆய்வு வரம்புகள் (i):

22.05.2018 ஆம் நாள் நடந்த துப்பாக்கிச் சூட்டின் விளைவாக இறப்பு, காயங்கள் ஏற்பட்டதற்கான காரணங்கள், சூழ்நிலைகள் குறித்தும், தூத்துக்குடியிலும் அதன் அருகாமைப்பகுதிகளிலும் சட்டம் மற்றும் ஒழுங்கு கீர்குலைவுகள் காரணமாக பொதுச் சொத்துக்கள், தனியார் சொத்துக்கள் ஆகியவற்றிற்கு ஏற்படுத்தப்பட்ட சேதம் உள்ளிட்ட பிந்தைய நிகழ்வுகள் குறித்தும் விசாரணை செய்வதற்காக.

ஆய்வு வரம்புகள் (ii):

சூழ்நிலைகளுக்கு ஏற்றவாறு தகுந்த உரிய படை பயன்படுத்தப்பட்டதா என்பது குறித்தும், துப்பாக்கிச்சூடு நடத்துவதற்கு முன்னர் உரிய அனைத்து முன்னெச்சரிக்கை நடைமுறைகளும் கடைபிடிக்கப்பட்டனவா என்பதைக் கண்டறிவதற்காக.

முடிவுகள்:

பல்வேறு கோணங்களில் ஒட்டுமொத்தமாகக் கருதுகிற போது, மேற்சொன்ன சம்பவம், காவல்துறை அதன் உரிய அதிகாரத்தைப் பயன்படுத்தியதற்கான ஒரு நிகழ்வு அல்ல என்றும், நிச்சயமாக வரம்பை மீறியுள்ளது என்றும், அதன் நடைமுறையில் செய்யத்தக்கனவற்றைச் செய்யாமலும், செய்யத் தகாதவற்றைச் செய்திருக்கிறது என்று மட்டுமே இந்த ஆணையம் முடிவுக்கு வரவேண்டியுள்ளது.

ஆய்வு வரம்புகள் (iii):

காவல் துறையினர் அத்துமீறி செயல்பட்டுள்ளனரா என்பதையும் அவ்வாறெனில் மேற்கொள்ள வேண்டிய நடவடிக்கை குறித்து உறுதியாய் அறிவதற்காக.

முடிவுகள்:

காவல்துறை தரப்பில் நிச்சயமாக மிகை நடவடிக்கை எடுக்கப்பட்டிருப்பதாக விசாரணை ஆணையம் முடிவிற்கு வந்ததையடுத்து, குற்றவியல் நடவடிக்கை எடுப்பதற்கு குந்தகமின்றி 17 காவல்துறை அலுவலர்கள் மீது துறைசார்ந்த நடவடிக்கை எடுக்கவும், அப்போதைய தூத்துக்குடி மாவட்ட ஆட்சியர் மற்றும் மூன்று வருவாய்த்துறை அலுவலர்கள் மீது துறைசார்ந்த நடவடிக்கை எடுக்கவும் பரிந்துரைத்தது. விசாரணை ஆணையம், இறந்தவரின் உறவினர்கள்/சட்டப்பூர்வ வாரிசுகளுக்கு ரூ.50/- லட்சம் இழப்பீட்டுத் தொகையை, ஏற்கெனவே வழங்கிய ரூ.20/- லட்சத்தைக் கழித்துவிட்டு வழங்கவும், காயமடைந்தவருக்கு ரூ.10/- லட்சம் இழப்பீட்டுத் தொகையை, ஏற்கெனவே வழங்கிய ஐந்து லட்சம் ரூபாயைக் கழித்துவிட்டு வழங்கவும் பரிந்துரைத்தது. இறந்துபோன திரு.ஜஸ்டின் செல்வமிதீஷின் உயிரிழப்பை, இந்த துப்பாக்கிச் சூட்டில் இறந்துபோன 13 நபர்களுக்கு இணையாக பாவித்து அவர் குடும்பத்தார்க்கு அரசு சார்பில் தகுந்த நிவாரணத்தை வழங்கவும், அவரது தாயாருக்கு பணி வழங்கவும், பலத்த காயம் அடைந்த காவலர் திரு.மணிகண்டன் அவர்களுக்கு மருத்துவ வசதிக்கான நிவாரணம் வழங்கவும் ஆணையம் மேலும் பரிந்துரைத்தது.

ஆய்வு வரம்புகள் (iv):

இதுபோன்ற நிகழ்வுகள் வருங்காலத்தில் மீண்டும் நிகழாமல் இருப்பதற்கு தகுந்த நடவடிக்கைகளை பரிந்துரைப்பதற்காக.

முடிவுகள்:

இனிவருங்காலங்களில் இத்தகைய நிகழ்வுகள் ஏற்படுவதைத் தவிர்ப்பதற்கு, சில நிருவாக நடவடிக்கைகளை விசாரணை ஆணையம் பரிந்துரைத்துள்ளது.

6. சம்பந்தப்பட்ட அலுவலர்களுக்கு எதிராகத் துறைசார்ந்த நடவடிக்கையைத் தொடங்கும் வகையில், உள், மதுவிலக்கு மற்றும் ஆயத்தீர்வைத் துறை பொதுத் (சிறப்புA) துறை மற்றும் வருவாய் மற்றும் பேரிடர் மேலாண்மைத் துறைகளுக்கு, விசாரணை ஆணைய அறிக்கைகளின் தொடர்புடைய பகுதிகள் அனுப்பப்பட்டுள்ளன.

7. நீதிபதி திருமதி அருணா ஜெகதீசன் விசாரணை அறிக்கை, 29.8.2022 அன்று அமைச்சரவைக் கூட்டத்தில் விவாதிக்கப்பட்டது. துறை ரீதியான நடவடிக்கையைத் தொடங்குவது தொடர்பாக, விசாரணை ஆணையத்தின் பரிந்துரை, பரிசீலனையில் கீழ் உள்ளதை, அமைச்சரவை கவனத்தில் எடுத்துக் கொண்டதுடன் விசாரணை ஆணையத்தின் அறிக்கையை எடுக்கப்பட்ட நடவடிக்கை பற்றிய அறிக்கையுடன் தமிழ்நாடு சட்டமன்றப் பேரவையில் வைக்க முடிவு செய்தது.

8. விசாரணை ஆணையத்தின் I & II ஆம் ஆய்வு வரம்புகள் தொடர்பாக, விசாரணை ஆணையத்தின் பரிந்துரைகளை அரசு முழுமையாக ஏற்றுக்கொண்டுள்ளது. ஆய்வு வரம்புகள்-III தொடர்பான விசாரணை ஆணையத்தின் பரிந்துரைகளை, அதிகாரிகளுக்கு எதிராக துறை ரீதியான நடவடிக்கையை எடுக்கவேண்டும் எனவும், பார்வை 2 மற்றும் 4-ல் படிக்கப்பட்ட கீழ்ப்பீடு மற்றும் உதவித்தொகை என்ற வரையறைக்கு உட்பட்டு ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டுள்ளது. ஆய்வு வரம்பு IV- தொடர்பான பரிந்துரைகளை கொள்கையளவில் ஏற்கும் அதே வேளையில், குறிப்பிட்ட ஆலோசனைகள், தொடர்புடைய துறைகளால் பொருத்தமான ஆணைகளை வழங்குவதற்காக, மேற்கொண்டும் விரிவாக ஆய்வு செய்யப்படலாம் என்று அரசு முடிவு செய்துள்ளது.

9. உ.ள், மதுவிலக்கு மற்றும் ஆயத்தீர்வை: பொது (சிறப்பு.A) மற்றும் வருவாய் மற்றும் பேரிடர் மேலாண்மை துறைகளில், சம்பந்தப்பட்ட அதிகாரிகளின் மீது துறைநீதியான நடவடிக்கை மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்டுள்ளது.

(ஆளுநரின் ஆணைப்படி)

வெ.இரையன்பு

அரசு தலைமைச் செயலாளர்

பெறுநர்

அரசு கூடுதல் தலைமைச் செயலாளர்,

உ.ள், மதுவிலக்கு மற்றும் ஆயத்தீர்வைத் துறை, சென்னை-9.

அரசு முதன்மைச் செயலாளர்,

வருவாய் மற்றும் பேரிடர் மேலாண்மைத் துறை, சென்னை-9.

அரசுச் செயலாளர், பொது (சட்டம் மற்றும் ஒழுங்கு-F) மற்றும் (சிறப்பு.A)த் துறைகள், சென்னை-9.

காவல் துறைத் தலைமை இயக்குநர்/காவல் துறைத் தலைவர்,
தமிழ்நாடு, சென்னை-4.

மாவட்ட ஆட்சியாளர், தூத்துக்குடி மாவட்டம்.

துணை காவல் துறைத் தலைவர், திருநெல்வேலி சரகம்.

நகல்:

ஆளுநரின் முதன்மைச் செயலாளர், ஆளுநர் மாளிகை, சென்னை-25.

மாண்புமிகு முதலமைச்சரின் முதன்மைச் செயலாளர்-1, சென்னை-9.